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Output, Employment and Wages in tile Small Open Economy
by
Kleran A. Kennedy and R. N. Vaughan
¯ .
I. Introduction
The high level of employment consistently maintained by most
western countries during the 1950s and 1960s lent credence to Keynes’s view
that the level of effective demand was the main determinant of output, and,
therefore, of employment. A reappraisal of this view appeared necessary
in the 1970s as governments faced accelerating inflation and unemployment.
Alternative schools developed, attempting to discredit the notion that govern-
ment-induced variations in aggregate demand could necessarily maintain
output, and, thus, employment, at desired levels. The aim of this paper
is to consider the short-run interrelations between output, employment and
wages, with special reference to the small open economy; and to contrast
the policy implications for such an economy with those arising from the
traditional "Keynesian" closed economy model.
II. The Model
We take as our framework the standard macro model as illus-
trated in Figure !, which will serve to illustrate both the closed and the small
open economy models. Incomes and expenditures are measured in real
terms, labour is homogeneous, and the capital stock is assumed fixed.
Quadrant 1 shows the relationship between domestic demand
(Yd) and the domestic supply of output (Ys)
, 
the latter being equal to domestic
income. In the closed economy, domestic demand is, of course, the same
as aggregate demand. It consists of consumption, which is taken to be a
function of domestic income, and of investment and government demand
which are taken as exogenous. In the small open economy model considered
here, all goods produced domestically are exportable in unlimited quantities,
and are subject to unlimited competition from imports, at given world prices.
Imports of goods not produced at home ("non-competingw’ imports: (IM)I in
Figure 1) are taken to be a function of domestic income.
In Quadrant 2, F(N) illustrates the relationship be~veen total
output and employment, under the assumption of a constant stock of capital
1. The authors would like to express particular thanks to their colleague,
J. Durk~n, who first called their attention to one of the basic ideas under-
lying this paper. They would also like t~ thank Tony Foley, Olympios
Katsiaouni, Finola Kemmdy and Robert O’ Connor for commenting on earlie r
drafts.
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ogoods. The form of the relationship depends on technological considerations,
1
but assuming, as we do, that all relative output prices are unchanged, F(N)
represents unambiguously the supply schedule of domestic real output; and
it is possible to speak unambiguously of a single general price level for all
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producers and domestic consumers. As drawn in Figure 1, F(N) exhibits
short-run decreasing returns to labour (SRDRL).
Quadrant 3 depicts the relationship (L - L’) between the real
wage {w/p) and the demand for labour by firms. If there were perfect com-
petition in all markets, the real wage would equal the marginal physical
product of labour, and SRDRL would necessarily prevail. Although the
L- L’ curve in Figure 1 shows an inverse relationship between employment
and the real wage, we do not wish to limit the analysis, however, to perfectly
competitive conditions or to the case of SRDRL. The curve may be viewed
simply as an empirical relationship, dependent on such factors as the struc-
ture of aggregate output, the technology and the state of competition. The
money wage is (initially) treated as exogenously determined - the effect of
past history and bargaining between firms and trade unions. The determina-
tion of changes in the price level differs as between the closed and small open
economy systems and is discussed later in considering the operation of these
systems. At any given real wage, defined by the money wage and the price
¯ level, the supply of labour is regarded as perfectly elastic.
Quadrant 4 shows the relationships between the real wage and
domestic demand and between the real wage and domestic supply. It is
evident that these relationships derive from those in the other three quadrants;
but it is important to emphasise that we have not yet specified the direction
of causality.
The model may be seen to have four sets of agents: firms,
households, the government, and, for the open economy, foreigners. Given
1. In the closed economy, the assumption of constant relative prices implies
a further highly restrictive assumption that, when effective demand changes,
the pattern of demand matches precisely the pattern of supply that may be
evoked: otherwise, there would be excess demand or supply for individual
goods, causing pressure for relative price changes. In the small open
economy model all relative output prices are imposed by the international
market.
2. If relative prices, as well as relative quantities, of output were allowed
to vary, then not only would it be impossible to measure changes in the general
price level unambiguously, but, more important, the real wage among pro-
ducers, and as between producers and wage-earners, could vary differently;
so that a more complex framework, not readily open to diagramatic treatment,
would be necessary. The mathematical appendix gives some consideration
to this issue.
g~
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the capital stock, and the ruling prices of commodities and factors, firms
wl!l wish to produce certain outputs of commodities. With their desired
outputs determined, firms will hire the requisite labour from households¯
The excess of sales revenue over the cost of producing outputs is the firms’
profit, part of which may be retained for purposes of investment and part
distributed to shareholders, who may either be domestic households or
foreigners. With the incomes received from the sale of labour services
and receipts of distributed profits, households may purchase the production
of firms, and, in the open economy, they may also purchase goods from
foreigners. Likewise, foreigners may purchase the outputs of domestic
firms. The government may purchase goods and labour services. It can
also receive income by taxing the incomes of individuals and the profit of
firms, though for simplicity of exposition, this aspect has not been explicitly
developed in the model.
The economy is in equilibrium when all markets are cleared.
This position may not be attained, andwe are concerned particularly with
the case where the labour market fails to clear, i.e. where there are indi-
viduals willing and able to work at or below the going real wage, but unable
to find offers of employment. In the neo-classical view, emphasis on non-
market clearing has focussed on price inflexibility as the root cause of the
trouble. As is now realised, flexibility of prices is not a sufficient condition
for market clearing. Keynesians emphaslse precisely the fact that markets
may remain uncleared even with price flexibility. Unlike the neo-classical
approach where all markets are of equal weight (in a causal sense) in a
general clearing operation, the Keynesian viewpoint accords primacy to the
commodity market. Given equilibrium between aggregate demand and supply
for commodities, the demand for labour derived from the resulting level of
output does not necessarily equal the available supply of labour. Although
the labour market is not cleared, signals from the labour to the commodity
market have no major effect. Even if workers were willing to accept a real
wage cut, the labour market would still not be cleared, since aggregate
demand would be insufficient to absorb the potential increase in output and
employment. We have a situation of under-employment equilibrium in which
feedback mechanisms between markets do not work. 1 The Keynesian¯system,
therefore, envisages the following causal chain:
1. An allied stream of Keynesian theory may admit the existence of such
mechanisms, but consider the Keynesian model to apply to the period in
which feedback has not had time to operate - the so-called Keynesian "dis-
equilibrium" model (see, for example, Ciower (1965), Patinkin (1965),
Letjonhufvud (1968), Burro and Grossman (1976)).
.Aggregate demand * Output -~ Employment.1
However, in a private enterprise economy, not necessarily competitive or
profit maxhnising, but profitability conscious, the chain is not seen by pro-
ducers in this fashion. In essence, output and employment decisions are
made with regard to the most profitable position for firms. We, therefore,
have an alLernative chain as seen by suppliers:
Wage rate -~ Costs -* Profitability -* Output -~ Employment.
These two chains imply quite different constraints on market
clearing: in different circumstances output and employment may be con-
strained by one of these chains and not the other. When expansion is limited
by the first chain, we may speak of the economy as "demand-constrained";
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in the seco~id case, it is "cost-constrained". The applicable case in any
given circumstances is a matter for empirical investigation, and the wide-
spread emphasis on the first chain, as evidenced in the literature, should
not blind us to the other. In the following sections of the paper, we shall
explore at a general level the circumstances in which each chain is likely
to be most relevant.
It will be obvious that Figure 1 is not a complete represen--.
ration of the usual macro system. We have not included money, or other
assets. Our concern in this paper, however, lies only with the broad policy
implications arising from the interrelation between the labour and commodity
markets. Thus, monetary measures operating on output and employment
through changes in the investment or consumption demand schedules are
subsumed with other measures, such as fiscal policy, aimed at changing
domestic demand; while monetary measures affecting the exchange rate
are treated as part of exchange rate policy. For completeness, a monetary
sector is added to the mathematical representation in the Appendix. Another
omission as compared with the standard model is the neglect of explicit con-
sideration of the effect of changes in income distribution on domestic demand.
Within the terms of the model, however, each point on the L - L’ curve may
be interpreted as defining not merely a unique level, but also a unique dis-
tribution, of domestic income, the influence of which on demand is taken
into account in the shape of the Yd curve.
1. This causal sequence of the Keynesian theory has been stressed in, for
example, Pasinetti (1974). Fiscal and monetary instruments, of course,
may serve to determine aggregate demand, as may the distribution of income,
exports, etc.
2. Further constraints, e.g. resource or foreign balance, may also prevent
the achievement of full employment.
5.
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HI. The CIosed E’conomy
We examine briefly the operation of the model in relation to
the closed economy with a view to re-iterating some points which, though
well established, are still sometimes neglected in the theoretical literature
and more often in policy discussions.
Consider a real wage rate (w/P)l, starting in Quadrant 3.
Firms will now wish to produce output of YI’ employing N1 workers. At
this level of national income, with aggregate demand exceeding aggregate
supply, we may say that an "inflationary gap" exists. What is the mechanism
by which this gap may be closed? Since there is excess demand in the com-
modity sector, the prices of commodities may be bid up, either by consumers
unable to satisfy their wants or, more usually, by firms Seeing their inven-
tories depleted and finding, themselves able to raise prices without reducing
the demand for products. Will such price increases lead t0a fall in the
aggregate demand schedule or a rise in domestic, output, so as to close the
inflationary gap7 Aggregate demand may be reduced if the price rise reduces
the level of real money balances held by individuals. There is little empirical
evidence, however, to show that such an effect, if it does take place, would    :
be significant or would operate within a reasonable time. An increase in
output can occur only if the real wage rate is lowered. If the money wage :
rate is exogenously determined, as in effect postulated by Keynes (1936),
then a real wage cut will be secured by rising prices, and output will expand
to close the gap. But if unions resist the real wage cut, then the money wage
can no longer be viewed as exogenous, but responsive to price changes also.
Where unions will not tolerate a fall in the real wage, changes in the price
level will have little or no effect in closing the inflationary gap. We have
then a "price-wage" spiral; prices are bid up and so are money wages; and
’ there is no correcting mechanism in the system, unless the government acts
to restrict demand by appropriate fiscal or monetary policy, thereby validating
the real wage sought by the unions. Thus, we can see how an inflationary
situation may develop, even though the economy is far from full employment.
In this case, we may describe the economy as "cost-constrained".
Even if equilibrium were achieved in the commodity market
(with the real wage at (w/p)2 and income Ye), this need not coincide with the
full employment level of income. The economy has settled at an under-
employment equilibrium of the "kind identified by Keynes. In such a situation,
the Keynesian prescription of increasing effective demand will succeed only
ff the real wage is permitted to fall to (w/p)3. But if the real wage rate
oremains at (w/p)2, the economy is still cost-constrained; firms have no
incentive to push output beyond Ye; and demand expansion will simply lead
the economy into an inflationary position, even though far short of full
employment. 1
The solution offered by the classical economists for an economy
at Y was a real wage cut. Let us Suppose that unions were agreeable to
O
this, whether it came about through a rise in prices or a fall in the money
wage rate. At the reduced real wage rate (w/P)3, firms would wish to pro-
duce the level of output that would secure full employment. If they went
ahead and tried to do so, however, the rise in aggregate demand would be
insufficient to match the rise in supply. Firms would find their inventories
rising, prices would decline, the real wage would revert to (w/P)3, and the
level of income to Y . The economy is then demand-constrained.
e
Thus, in a demand-constrained situation, a real wage cut
alone is powerless to take the economy to full employment. Equally, demand
stimulation may not work unless the real wage falls - the cost-constrained
2
case. Keynes was well aware of this, fully accepting that: "In a given
state of organisation, equipment and technique, the real wage earned by a
unit of labour has a unique (inverse) correlation with the volume of employ-
ment" (Keynes (1936), p.17). He did not envisage this as a problem, however:
1. Where unions are sufficiently powerful to keep the real wage at (w/p)2 in
the face of a rise in effective demand, it is clear that Keynes (1936) would
regard the associated level of employment, Ne, as full employment. Full
employment, in Keynes’s terms, exists when "aggregate employment is in-
elastic in response to an increase in the effective demand for its output" (p. 26);
or, alternatively, when there is no "involuntary" unemployment, implying
"equality of the real wage to the marginal disutility of employment" (p. 15).
Such use of the term "involuntary" would be reasonable if all individuals
fully endorsed the union position. But in circumstances where some indi-
viduals would be quite willing to work at a lower real wage, but cannot find
offers of employment due to union resistance to real wage cuts in any form,
It seems strange to say that there is no involuntary unemployment, Keynes’s
position is rather akin to that of a doctor who, having invented a cure for
sickness but being unable to apply it because of opposition from the healthy
majority, proclaims that there is no sickness - or, at least, no involuntary
sickness’ It would probably be nearer the mark to say that involuntary un-
employment exists as long as there are individuals not at work whose mar-
gtnal disutility of labour is less than the reaL wage. While such a definition
would suffice for our present purposes, even then, of course, it does not
include other forms of unemployment that might reasonably be classed as
"involuntary" - such as monopsonistic exploitation of labour.
2. If, at a level short of full employment, the demand curve for labour
becomes completely inelastic, then no further increase in employment is
possible even though the real wage were to fall to zero. This may be classed
as resource-constrained unemployment, Cypical of undeveloped countries, to
which the’solution lies in longer-term measures, such as increasing the
capital stock.
owhile holding that workers would fight a cut in money wages, he believed
that they would not resist a fall in real wages induced by rising prices - at
least until full’employment approached. This belief migt~t have been well
founded in the circumstances of the 1930s, but it Is doubtful if it accurately
reflects present-day conditions. Where it does not apply, then as Viner
pointed out so long ago: ’tin a world organised in accordance with Keynests
specifications there would be a constant race between the printing press and
the business agents of the trade unions, with the problem of unemployment
largely solved if the printing press could maintain a constant lead 3.ud if only
volume of employment, irrespective of quality, Is considered important"
(Viner (1936), p.149).
This difficulty would be averted, of course, if there were a
constant or increasing relationship between the demand for labour and the
real wage. Such a relationship might arise for a number of reasons, such
as the nature of technology or the greater utilisation of overhead labour as
1
output expands. An economy ls indeed fortunate if that situation prevails
since demand stimulation will then increase employment while maintaining,
2
or even increasing, the real wage. But there can be no certainty that this
congenial position is of universal application even in developed countries,
and the neglect of the cost-constrained possibility is part of a general ten-
dency to over-emphasise demand, at the expense of supply, considerations.
IV. The Small Open Economy
-
The degree of openness of an economy may be viewed as
depending on the impact of foreign sources of supply and demand h~ all
markets of that economy. The small open economy may be taken as one
where there is unidirectional causality from the foreign source to the
domestic economy. In the completely open economy, with perfect mobility
of factors as well as products, full employment may be maintained through
migration, and both the need and the scope for domestic policy are greatly
1. See, for example, Kuh (1966). Keynes was reluctant to admit that such
a relationship Would apply all the way to full employment (Keynes (1939)).
For some recent evidence on the subject, relating to production workers in
United States manufacturing, see Sims (1974).
2. Even with an increasing relationship between the demand for labour and
the real wage, an economy may still be cost-constrained where unions press
for a higher real wage as unemployment falls - in other words, if the aggre-
gate supply curve of labour becomes sufficiently inelastic even though there
are unemployed workers prepared to work at the going real wage. This
"dog-in-the-manger" situaLioa is unlikely to be of practical significance
except in special circumstances, .however, since unions could secure a
higher realwage by moderating their demands and allowing the level of
employment to expand - provided, of course, the economy is not also
demand-constrained.
.....
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oattenuated.1 The model of openness considered here is where there is Im-
perfect labour mobility but complete capital and product mobility. Thus,
with a fixed exchange rate, the rate of interest and the price level are taken
to be determined externally, but there may be unemployed worker~ at a given
real wage.
It is scarcely necessary to warn that no small economy will
conform precisely to our specification. Such factors as transport costs,
non-traded goods, imperfect substitution between traded goods, taxes and
subsidies, and many other institutional factors will given even a small open
economy with a fixed exchange some degree of control over the level of, and,
to a lesser degree, the rate of change in, domestic prices. But just as
valuable insights can be derived at one extreme from the closed economy
model, even though no western economy is wholly closed, it is also of
interest to consider the small open economy model which, though it lies at
the other extreme, may be nearer to the position of an increasing number
of countries - particularly smaller countries within a customs union such
as the EEC.
In terms of Figure 1, let us again consider the case where
the real wage rate is at (w/P)1, employment at N1, and income at Y1; and
there is, thus, a gap between domestic demand and domestic supply. Part
of the gap is filled by "non-competing" (or "complementary") imports, as
indicated by the curve Yd - (IM)I" In the small open economy with a fixed
exchange rate, unlike the closed economy, prices cannot rise to attempt
closure of the remaining gap. Prices are given internationally, and if
domestic producers attempted to raise price they would lose their entire
market share. In such circumstances, the excess of domestic demand
(less non-competing imports) over domestic supply will be taken up by in-
creased imports2 and/or reduced exports. Thus, whereas in the closed
economy the gap results in an inflationary spiral, in the small open economy
0
it results In a deterioration in the current balance of payments. Can such
a position persist indefinitely? If the current balance of payments deficit
can be met by a continuing capital Inflow, no pressure for change exists in
the system. If this is not so, pressure may be expected on the exchange
rate, which will have to fall eventually. Whether such a fall will improve
1. Even in the purely open case, however, matters such as the employment
and total population sustained within the boundaries of the state, and the
standard of living of that population, may remain of great importance, and
susceptible to longer-term developmental measures.
2. These "shortfall" imports are in addition to the normal "complementary"
imports, which may vary directly wittl national output.
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the situation depends on the behaviour of wages. If, through rising money
wages, the level of real wages is maintained in the face of rising domestic
prices consequential on the falling exchange rate, then the balance of pay-
ments deficit will not be closed. Thus, with rigidity of real wages, we
have a similarity to the "price-wage" spiral in the closed economy: this
time, the "exchange rate-price-wage" spiral. Again, only corrective
government action restricting domestic demand can bring about stability.
Suppose now that equilibrium is attained at Ye with the real
wage rate at (w/p)2. At that point, current external payments are in balance,
since non-competing imports are exactly matched by an excess of exports
over competing imports. The economy, however, is still far short of the
full employment level Yf. In the closed economy, we saw that, given an
Inverse relation between the demand for labour and the real wage, both a
real wage cut and demand expansion were required to move to full employ-
ment. ¯ The same would hold true for an open economy where exports are
exogenously determined. But the assumption that the volume of exports is
exogenously determined is quite untenable for the small open economy where
prices are also assumed to be entirely determined abroad. The latter
assumption necessarily implies a perfectly elastic demand for exports, and
a perfectly elastic supply of imports, at the international price level pre-
vailing for the particular goods in question. In that event, the small open
economy would never be demand-constrained; and, provided it is not
resource-constrained, a real wage cut will always suffice to bring the
economy to full employment.1 Changes in the domestic demand schedule,
either exogenously or through the use of the government policies, will simply
affect the trade balance; while, for employment expansion, there is no
necessity to boost domestic dbmand if real wages are cut, since the extra
output can be exported. In effect,, the aggregate demand curve in Figure 1
lies along the 45° line. The situation is as if Say’s law applied; but it is
not that supply creates its own demand, but rather that there is an exogenous
source of demand available to absorb any extra output that can be supplied
at the going world price.
Some important implications from the small open economy
model contrast sharply with the traditional closed and open economy models.
First, saving has none of the undesirable connotations ascribed to it by
Keynes. An ex ant.....__~e, or intended, rise in the propensity to save is
|
I. Indeed, if there is a constant or increasing relationship between the
demand for labour and the real wage all the way to full employment, then
there is no constraint whatever on the attainment of full employment in the
small open economy.
.......
10.
realised ~. It does not restrict output or employment in the short
run, and the resources can be held abroad in foreign balances to yield
foreign income or, if so desired, used to finance increased domestic invest-
merit. Second, an autonomous cut in money wages is translated into a
cut in real wages to the benefit of employment - unlike the Keynesian closed
economy case where labour cannot normally effect a reduction in the real
wage by accepting a reduction in the money wage. Third, unlike many open
economy models, the trade balance always improves as the level of output
and employment expands.1 There is no trade-off, therefore, between full
employment and the balance of payments. The economy may, indeed, have
a current balance of payments deficit at full employment, but the deficit
would be larger if employment were lower. A cut in domestic demand will
correct the deficit without any adverse effect on the level of employment.
Finally, there is an implication arising from the simplifica-
tion of keeping relative (world) prices unchanged, which must be qualified
once that assumption is removed. The model implies that a depression in
world demand, communicating itself through changes in the level, but not
the relativity, of world prices, need have no effect on either the level of
employment or real wages in the small open economy:
provided the money wage or the exchange rate were c .hanged,
full employment could be maintained at the same real wage. This need no
longer hold, however, once relative world prices change. If, to take a
topical example, a world depression is associated with a large relative rise
in the price of non-competing Imports (e.g. oil), then the small open economy
may experience simultaneously a rise in unemployment, a fail in the real
purchasing power of wages, and balance of payments troubles. It remains
true, however, that the economy is not demand-constrained, and that a real
1. If this implication seems to clash with experience of small open
economies, it is worth noting, however, that in a dynamic, Harrod-Domar,
version of such a model, the balance of trade deficit will, in fact, increase
with the growth rate of the economy, in Harrod’s terminology, the equi-
librium growth equation for the small open economy model with a given
capital-output ratio is GwCr = s + m1 + z, where Gw, Cr and s have the
same interpretation as in Harrod (1948); m1 is the propensity to import
non-competing goods; and z is the difference between competing imports
and exports as a proportion of domestic income. If there were no restric-
tion on the size of z, G, the actual growth rate, and Gw, the warranted
growth ratel would always be equated through adjustment in z, so that the
highly unstable situation in Harrod’s model would not apply; and, for given
values of Cr, s and ml, the greater is G the greater is z. Obviously, it
would be quite unrealistic to assume that z could continue indefinitely at a
high level, but consideration of dynamic adjustment mechanisms lies beyond
the scope of this paper.
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wage cut, if sufficiently large, can .restore full employment and improve
the balance of payments,                                       e
V. Policy Implications
The policies that would be advocated, if the above represen-
tation were an adequate reflection of reality, delimit the usefulness of
demand manipulation, via fiscal or monetary means, as an aid to seeking
improvements in domestic output and employment. Even in the closed
economy, the possibility exists that employment expansion may be cost-
constrained, in which case increasing aggregate demand simply generates
a price-wage spiral. In the small open economy, domestic demand manage-
ment would be an irrelevancy from the point of view of expanding output and
employment. What such demand management would accomplish is to deter-
mine the split of domestic demand between foreign and domestic supply, but
not the level of domestic supply.1 ttence, demand management is primarily
an instrument for altering the balance of trade.
The essence of a solution to unemployment in the small open
economy is a real wage cut.2 In principle, this could be achieved by money
wage duts or devaluation. Although, unlike the closed economy, money
wage cuts would work, they run up against KeynesVs other objection, namely,
that they would be unacceptable to any single group of workers because of
fears that its relative wages would suffer in the process; whereas, in his
view, ’tit would be impracticable to resist every reduction of real wages,
due to a change in the purchasing-power of money which affects all workers
alike" (Keynes (1936), p.14). Devaluation in the small open economy,
which seeks to effect a reduction in real wages through a general price rise,
is, therefore, closely analogous to boosting aggregate demand in the closed
economy. And just as in the cost-constrained closed economy, boosting
demand will only work if there is money wage restraint, so the success of
devaluation in the small open economy depends on money wage restraint -
otherwise, exchange rate flexibility simply leads to an "exchange rate - price
-wage" spiral. If such restraint is not forthcoming spontaneously, then
1. Cf. Llndbeck (1976). Mundell (1968) concludes that fiscal policy may
.be effective in raising output and employment in a small open economy with
a fixed exchange rate. in his model, however, the cost-constrained situa-
tion is not considered, and the demand constraint on output implies that the
elasticity of demand for domestic supply is less than perfectly elastic.
2. Higher output per worker at the existing real wage level (whether
attained through harder work, better 0rganisation, etc) would, of course,
serve equally well.
12.
incomes policy is the only other possibility open to the government to try to
secure the real wage cut needed to raise employment.
If.world prices generally are rising, then money wage res-
traint, rather than an outright cut, would suffice to raise the level of employ-
ment. Full indexing of wages to prices, by eliminating the possibility of a
real wage cut, would deprive the economy of any means of increasing employ-
ment. Once full employment is reached, revaluation is the appropriate
measure to maintain domestic price stability in the face of generally rising
world prices. Until full employment is reached, however, revaluation to
maintain domestic price stability would be a misguided policy if employment
is the primary goal - unless, of course, money wages are sufficiently flexible
downwards.
In practice, of course, there are numerous reservations
applying to the type of policy conclusions emanating from so simple a model,
the most important relating to the fact that an economy is composed of a
number of sectors, some of which are wholly or partly sheltered from foreign
competition. With differing demand, as well as supply, conditions prevailing
in different sectors, the government may be able to alter the composition of
output to secure greater employment at any given real wage. Clmnges in
policy with respect to restrictive practices may also increase the demand
for labour at each wage level. In the longer-term, changes in the capital
stock and in technology may accomplish the same object.
For short-term employment policy, however, the focus of
attention in developed economies has been on the two restrictive chains dis-
cussed above - cost-constrained and demand-constrained - with primacy
generally being accorded by most Keynesians to the latter. The analysis
suggests that, for small open economies at least, the cost-constrained
chain is more likely to be the operative one. The model of the small open
economy developed here depends for its conclusions on two crucial assump-
tions.- (a) perfect elasticity of demand for its output at ruling international
prices; and (b) an inverse relationship between the real wage and employ-
ment. If (a) holds but not (b), then the only effective restriction on achieving
full employment would be a binding constraint of a resource other than labour.
Given that their own actions are unlikely to have a significant effect on inter-
national prices, the existence of small open economies with unemployed
13.
labour and capital resources constitutes a prima facie case for the deter-
ruination of output and employment by costs rather than demand.
VI. Conclusions
We have considered tile implications of a small open economy
model where all goods are subject to unlimited foreign competition. In such
an economy, many of the old-fashioned virtues - such as saving and money
income restraint - are fully restored to favour. Expansion of domestic
demand is ineffective as well as unnecessary for increasing employment,
and is relevant only to correcting a current balance of payments surplus.
Some of these lessons may have wider application, however.
Even in a completely closed economy, the possibility exists that unemploy-
ment may be due to cost-constraints, in which case increasing aggregate
demand simply generates a price-wage spiral. The overshadowing of such
issues of supply management by ttle dominant emphasis on demand manage-
ment may be the root cause of the poor performance of certain industrialised
countries1 since World War II. One may indeed suggest that the pre-Keynesian
fallacy that supply necessarily creates its own demand has been widely replaced
by the converse, and equally fallacious, assumption that demand necessarily
creates its own supply.
The Economic and Social Research Institute
Dublin
Kieran A. Kennedy
R. N. Vaughan
1. Ironically, some of these countries are now looking to new sources of
of raw materials to maintain their existing standard of living.
°
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Mathematical Appendix
The main propositions in the paper may be given a more formal
presentation by the construction of an algebraic model of the economy. A
number of such "models have, of course, been evidenced in the IHerature, and
we may note particularly the celebrated analysis of Mundell (1968). The
system used here consists of four markets - Labour, Commodities,
Bonds, though the bond market is not considered explicitly.
The equation system is as followst
Money, and
Vd = C+I+G (1)
c = c (v, ph/Pfh) (2)
G = C_, (3)
I = I(r) (4)
(IM) = m (Ys’ Ph/P~) (5)
Y = Y (N, K ) (6)
S
y + z
= va (7)
N = N (w/ph) (8)
m
Ph = ~X Pfc (9)
Pfh = X pf (1 O)
Pw ’= ~’h Ph + ¢’f Pfh (11)
Md
= PwL (Ys’ r) (12)
Ms = S + R (13)
r =
rf
(14)
Md = Ms (15)
The interpretation of the model is straightforward. We have a two-
good(1) model: a domestic good produced in competition with foreign suppllers,
and a non-competltlve import good (i.e. a good of which there is no home
production). The llst of variables is as follows (quantities of goods demanded and
produced being measured in real terms): Yd = domestic demand for the competitive
good, comprising consumption (C), investment (I) and government (G) demands.
Y denotes domestic supply of the competlt[ve good, which equals real national
income. (IM) are imports of the non-competltlve good, a function of domesHc
income and relative prices. (IM) refers to the total demand for these imports,
(1) Each’ "good" may of course be regarded as a basket of different commodities
w|th the relative price of the commodiHes within each basket remaining constant.
............. ¯ ................................................ L... .
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irrespective of whether it originates in the private or government sector, or on
whether it is desired for consumption or investment purposes. Z denotes the
disjunction between domestic supply and total home demand for the competitive
good, and is thus equal to the value of competitive imparts (Z > O) or competitive
exports (Z < O). N denotes employment; w the money wage; r the rate of interest.
Regarding the price equatlons, Pfc denotes the ruling international price for the
competitive good and .X" the exchange rate; so that the price of the competitive good
on the home market is Ph =XPfc" Private producers will always seek this price.
They need not charge less since they can always sell unlimited quantities on the
international market at price Pfc" They cannot charge in excess of Xpfc, othe~wise
they would loose their entire market share to foreign competitors, pf denotes the
ruling international price of the non-competit!ve import good, and Pfh its price in
domestic currency. Pw denotes the overall domestic price level, which we take as
a weighted index of the prlces of the competitive and non-competitive goods in
terms of the domestic currency. The weights, (r"h and ~-f, we shall specify 6__pri6rl,
(% +,,-f = I;o-h, ~>o),
although a more elaborate procedure would be to relate the weights to the importance
of competitive and non-competitlve goods in total domestic expenditure. Md
denotes the domestic demand for nominal money balances; Ms the domestic supply of
money balances, which equals the government’s holdings of bonds (S), plus it’s
holdings of foreign reserves (R), with S and R both measured in terms, of domestic
currency. Domestic and foreign bonds are perfect substitutes, and we assume cbmplete
capital mobility; the interest rate r is thus equated to the ruling international rate,
The system (1) - (15) may be reduced to
Ys = y (N, K) . (16)
Y + z = c (y, (i-f)., (I;,)
N = . (w/X~fc) (18)
X,, o + ,,-f’ (Y, : s ÷ R (,9)
The level of non-competltlve imports (IM) does not enter into the determination
of the level of domestic supply~ Ys’ of the competitive good, although of course
it remains an important factor in determining the balance of trade.
Taking the differential of (16) - (19), we therefore have,
aY -YldN =O$
~PfcdY(1-c1)+dz-d~- c2 ~f
(20)
Pfc ¯+ c2 ~ dp-f = o (21)
...................... ° .............. ~ ..............................................................
+ X~f = 0 (23)
where we have equated to zero the differential of those variables which we shall
assume invarlant throughout the analysis, nl, c2, etc., denote the partial
derivative of that function with respect to the first and second variable of its
argument. We assumeYlt c1, L1~O; c2, n1.¢ O.
Alternative solutions of (20) - (23) can now be considered depending
on which variables are taken as endogenous or exogenous.
Case !
The first case we consider |s where the government uses the reserves
(R) to stabillse the exchange rate. The endogenous variables are therefore,
Yst Nt Z, R; and the system (19) - (22) may I~e written,
1     "Yl O O
(1 - c1) O    1 O
O 1 O
PwL1 O O
dY
s
dN
O dZ
-1 dR
O
J~ +
nldW
×Pfc
dS
nlw
- ~ dX
X2-
Pfc
L Pw dX
X
e~fcd~f
-2
Pf
nlWd~f¢
-2X Pfc
LX [~hdPfc
The solution to which is given by,
dY
dN
dZ I
|
|
dR
"1    0 Yl O"
O O 1 O
-(I-ci) I -(i-cl)yI 0
PwL1    0 PwLlYl -1.
" ’IildW0
d~ +
lXPfc
dS
6,.
nlw
-’2 ~fc
XPfc
LX ~hd-Pfc + ~fdP
~
’24)
(2s)
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Assuming that the money wage rate is fixed, and that the trade balance
need not be in equilibrium, then we have the following implications regarding
the impact of demand or supply management policles.
The impact of demand stlmulation,vla monetary or fiscal policies, can be
1
seen as follows.~. Let the government attempt to expand the money supply via
open market operations (dS ¯ O)1 by purchasing bonds from indlvlduals.    In
the closed economy thls can be expected to bid up the price of bonds and thus
lower the rate of interest. Here,however, the country faces a supply curve
of inflnlte elasticity for bonds at the rullng internatlonal price (I/Ff). A
shortage of bonds can therefore never develop, and if the domestic supply of bonds is
insufficient to meet domestic demand, this demand can be met by the purchase of
foreign bonds. These have to be bought in foreign currency, and thus foreign
reserves are depleted (although forelgn assets of the econom~ taken as foreign bonds
plus reserves, remain unchanged). Thus as (24) implies we have a straight feedback
from government purchases of bonds (dS), to the reserves (dR), i.e. dR = -dS.
good (Z’
Natlonal Income (Ys), employment (N), and the trade balance of the competitive/
are unaffected by changes in S, and thus demand manipulatlon, v|a open-~market¯
operations are not an effective stab illsatlon tool in such an economy (dVd = CldYs
= O). Fiscal policy, [d’G :b O~, has no effect on the endogenous variables
[dYs = dN = dR = OJ, except on competitive imports (or exports), in which
case we have a straight feedback [dG = dZJ, i.e. an increase in government
expenditure leads to an equivalent reduction in competitive exports (or increase
in competitive imports). Thus, in the case of money wage rigidity, the
customary instruments of demand management have no effect on income and
employment.
We turn now to "supply-orlented" measures which we shall assume refer
to changing the costs and thus profltability of domestic production.    In the
present model, changesln profltabillty can only be induced by a change in the
relativlty of the money wage and the home price of the competitive good.
A decline in the money wage will increase output and employment [dVs, dN :~ O],
reduce competitive imports (or increase exports) [dZ ~ OJ, and increase reserves
EdR > O~. If we assume money wage inflexibility, then a change in profitability
can only be induced by a change in the home price tJ~rough a change in the exchange rate.
A depreciation of the currency, d,~’>O, w constant, will affect all the endogenous
variables, having positive effects on domestic supply [dV) O] and employment
[dN> O], a reduction in competitive imports (or increase in exports) [dZ ¯ O~and
a positive effect on reserves [dR > O].
.t
1;
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A rlse in the price of the non-competltive good with the price of the
competitive good urichanged Ed~f > O, d~fc = O~ has no effect on output (dYs = O)
or employment (dN = O). Insofar as it increases the general price level and thus
increases demand for nomln~l money balances, it will lead to an increase in the
reserves [dR > O]. Insofar as it generates a switch away from the purchase of the
non-competltlve to the competitive good, it would entail a reduction in exports
(orlncrease in imports) of the competitive good ~Z> O~.
A rlse in the price of the competitive good With the price of the non-competltlve
good unchanged [d~fc > O, clef = O] will increase output, employment, and the
reserves~ and    reduce imports (or increase exports) of the competitive good.
The above results have relied on the assumption of" a fixed money
wage. However as the exchange rate or relative prices vary, fluctuations in
the real wage will almost certainly occur. If workers seek to maintain constancy
of the real wage, then different consequences from those already noted will ensue.
The real wage may be defined as,
= w/pw
Assum|ng that workers seek constancy of this wage at some hlstor|cally determined
level (Wr), then for changes in the prices of goods and foreign exchange, we rnust
hove the relationship,
¯
, Pwdw ~’r dPw 
= Wr ~- dX + wr X E~-h d~fc + o--f a~pf]
(27)
Then substituting (27) in (22), we have~
dN +
n1 w a-f pf
Pfc kPfc Pw
n1 wr Q’fd fc
_
dFf : o (28)
¯ Pfc
Thus, if real wages are maintained at a constant level, changes in the exchange
rate will have no effect on output, employment or competitive imports (exports)
[dVs, dN, dZ = O~. However a depreciation ~dX ) O~, will increase reserves
dR ~ O]. A rise in the price of the competitive good with the price of the non-
competitive good unchanged ~d~fc ;~ O, d~f = O~ will increase output and
employment ~dYs, dN > OJ, reduce competitive imports EdZ~ O], and increase
reserves [dR > O’[. A rise in the price of the non-competltNe good with the price
of the competitive good unchanged, will reduce output and employment ~dY, dN < O~
and increase competitive imports [dZ > O’~ ; its effect on reserves is ambiguous
depending on the sign of the quantity
inPf¢]wr ¯ ~,-f¯ Pw L1 Yl 1
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Case II
The second case we consider is where the government allows the exchange
rate to fluctuate and maintains some desired level oF reserves (in terms of domestic
currency). The endogenous var|ables then becomet Ys’ N~ Z and .X ~ and the system
(20) - (23) may be written,
I
-Yl O     O
(I-cI)    O I O
wO nl~
X2pfc
O 1
dY$
dN
dZ
d.XPwPwL1 O O L
dG
O
c2°’P’fc    c2 P’-fc d-
n1 dw      n1 w
-
dS + dR- LX~h d-P’fc + ~f d-~f~
r-
The solution to (29)
’ "      Pw L
PwL ]
dN I - Yl(l"c1)
pwL
dZ I
XY1
Pw L1dXI
Yl (1-Cl)
¯ G,,
may be wr|ttent
Pw L
¯ ; O; -X(l_Cl)
; O; Pw L
~Y] (1"Cl) ;
; O;
Pw L1
(I - cI) ;
d~
1
A
n1 dw
y___
dS
n] (w
n,
Yl(1-c])
X
w
-n|
1
yl (l-cl-~
0
c2~c
+
Pf
+ dR
c2 Pfc’
-2    d~f
Pf
(~fc
°
\, .
9
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0
where
Z~ Pw LI w Pw L
=
.
nl(I - cI) ~pf ,X’Y1(1-cI)
< o (31)
The implications of (30) are as follows. With regard to monetary policy, if the
government attempts to expand the money supply via open-market operations
EdS > O], this will lead to downward pressure on the interest rate and an outward
movement of capital, which this time is not met from the reserves (dR = O). There is
a consequent depreciation of the currency [d)C > O], which leeds to increased demand
for domestic goods [dVs, dN > O], and a reduction in competitive imports (or
increase in competitive exports) [dZ < O]. Demand stimulation through an increase
in government expenditure [dG:’ O], will have no impact on output [dY = O],
s
employment [dN = O], or the exchange rate ~X = O], but leads to stralght
feedback into competitive imports (or exports). Thus an increase in government
expenditure is met by a one-to-one increase in competitive imports (or reduction
i. competitive exports) [d=-- dZ].
A reduction in the money wage [dw < O5 , leads to an increase ’
in output [dY > O~, and employment [dN> O~, a fall in competitive imports
s
[dZ< O], and an appreciation of the currency [ct~< O]. A rise in the price of the
non-competitlve good with the price of the competitive good unchanged
I.d~f > O, d~fc = O], has the effect of reducing output[dVs~* O~ and employment
[dN.’: O], increasing competitive imports [dZ> O], and appreciating the currency
~.~< O]. A rise in the price of the competitive good with the price of the non-
competitive good unchanged [d~fc :~ O, d~pf = O], has the effect of increasing
output and employment [dYs, dN> O], reducing competitive imports [dZ 1- O],
and appreciating the currency ~’d~< OJ.
Turning to the case where we assume constancy of the real wage,
then the solution of (29) becomes,
dN
dZ
O O 1 O
- (I -cI) I -Yi(I-ci) 0
XLI )~YlLI ,~
- --~--O
L pwL
o
c2d-Pfc c2 Pfc
t~ + ~.f
p..-f 2 cr~f
n1 w a-fPf nlWra-f c~f
fc  fcpw d fc +
(32)
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In this case monetary measures ~S~Y’~ have no impact except on the exchange
rate ~:)C> OJ. " Government expenditures have no impact except a straight feedback
into the trade balance ~ G-= dZJ.
With regard to relative price changes, an increase in the price of the
competitive good with the price of the nan-competltive good unchanged
[c~Pfc) O, d~pf= O], implles an increase in output and employment ~Ys’ dN;>-10]’
an increase in competitive exports (reduction in competitive imports)~dZ <. O~
andan appreciation of the currency ~< O:~. An increase in the prlce of the
non-competltlve good with the price of the competitive good unchanged,
IdOl> O, dJSfc = O],.. reduces.1 output and employment [dYs, dNZ O"7 and increases
competitive imports kdZ > O]. The effect on the exchange rate depends on the
slgn of the quantity
Pw Pfc
.
)
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to consider the short-run interrelations
between output, .employment and wages for the small open economy; and to
contrast the policy implications for such an economy with those arising from
the "Keynesian" closed economy model. Particular stress is laid on the
distinction between cost-constrained and demand-constralned unemployment.
the
Investigation of/efficacy of various policy measures suggests that the usefulness
of demand manipulation via fiscal or monetary means, as an aid to seeking
improvement in domestic output ,-rod employment, is rather limited.
